De Gaulle’s constitution, drafted between 1958 and 1962, specifically aimed at two goals. The first was to authorize de Gaulle and his successors to rule as executive presidents, embodying what General Julian Jackson’s biographer called “a certain idea of France.” The second goal was to keep the French left, and the Communist Party in particular, out of power for as long as possible. The system worked well for more than two decades, especially while the imperially charismatic de Gaulle was still alive, before François Mitterrand skillfully reshaped the left while the communists went down in history. Since Mitterrand’s time, however, both the old left and the old right have been fragmented into many smaller parties. However, de Gaulle’s electoral system was still strong enough this week to send France’s far right very effectively, for the third time in a millennium. Chapeau to the general for that. Much of the assessment for the 2022 election was rather negative for Macron’s victory. He has focused on his personal break-up, future economic and social problems, the reduction of his majority since 2017 and the 41.5% share that Marin Lepen achieved in the second round. These are important things. The June national elections will be much more confusing. But the crisis over the presidency undermines both the role of the Goliath regiment itself and Macron’s success in overthrowing it, something that escaped his two predecessors, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. Macron’s re-election shows that de Gaulle’s system still has gas in the tank. The 28% first-round vote on April 10 was at the top of the first-round standings achieved by the most recent French presidential winners, although a world away from 45% of de Gaulle himself in the first round in 1965. Almost In any other democracy, Macron’s 17-point margin of victory over Le Pen in the second round will be considered spectacular. But the results obscure what goes wrong with the system. The two-round mandate remains de Gaulle’s ambiguous legacy in French politics. Its constitution gives presidents a power that is both real (because it turns out to be a clear winner) and deceptive (because most people vote for someone else or do not vote at all). The combination of this mixed mandate and executive power survives – for the time being. However, it is becoming increasingly unstable, especially in a country with a dynamic tradition of French street politics. The system gives voice to the different political attitudes that are characteristic of every modern democracy, while at the same time covering them. Electoral fragmentation is now an integral feature of many 21st century democracies. The gap in the first round of the French presidential election is very similar to today’s European elections. Last year’s German election was a particularly notable case. At local level, it also compares to the gap in the run-up to next week’s Northern Ireland parliamentary elections. Many people are still tempted to view politics as a battle between a large party on the left and a large party on the right. Many facts and figures refute this. In France, the four strongest finishers on April 10 received 28%, 23%, 22% and 7% of the vote respectively. In Germany last year, the top four had 26%, 24%, 15% and 13%. In Northern Ireland (where the differences are not just left-right), the latest polls show that the four strongest parties are Sinn Fein with 26%, the Democratic Unionists 19%, the Alliance 16% and the Ulster Unionists 13%. If Northern Ireland were elected president by the French two-round system, it would mean a second round between Sinn Féin’s Michelle O’Neill and DUP’s Jeffrey Donaldson. This is never going to happen, fortunately for Northern Ireland, because it would fuel an entirely sectarian dynamic. However, it illustrates the built-in weakness of any electoral system, such as France, which translates minority support in the first round into a majority mandate in the second. Northern Ireland very deliberately does not do that. Instead, it’s rooted in the principles and practices of power-sharing in the 1998 Good Friday deal. front page news value worldwide and huge symbolic meaning. The fact that an area created 101 years ago specifically to distance itself from Irish republicanism would now have to elect a first minister from the same republican tradition is a milestone in anyone’s language. Under these circumstances, however, the chances of the DUP agreeing to appoint a deputy prime minister to work alongside O’Neill as prime minister are slim. The same is true of the possibility of an early referendum on the unification of Ireland. It is much more likely that the failure of the two main parties to work together (both may lose a share of the vote since the last showdown in 2017) will hasten the return of direct rule from London. If the UK government also overturns the Northern Ireland Protocol, as Lord Frost urged it to do in a speech on Wednesday, the distribution of power will again remain high and dry. Electoral systems matter. Germany, France and Northern Ireland illustrate some of the different ways this works. But they are not unusual. Electoral systems do not only reflect politics. they also shape the way politics is conducted. This also applies to Britain. The system of the first past usually turns an electoral minority into a constituency victory or a parliamentary majority. It is part of the reason why our politics is seen and heard as it seems. And it is increasingly defenseless in the pluralistic political climate of the 21st century. The next general election in Britain may bring back another suspended parliament, in which the electorate votes in favor of change, but does not give any party the mandate to rule. Replacing the first-past-the-post system will never be a big deal. But it would be an act of transformation for Britain, and an act that could be carried out by a minority Labor government. The ruined democracy of this country needs its own form of distribution of power. It would be a huge step towards re-creating a specific idea for Britain.
